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it violates the due process clause.50 The court limited the damages
allowable to the plaintiff before his cause of action was tried. If the
proof which the court required did not meet a certain objective standard, such as that required for summary judgment, the disposition was
arbitrary and therefore contrary to due process. A certain standard of
proof recognizable at law must be adduced to validate such a decision.
Thus, the Haas case may be challenged under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
ARTICLE

5 -VENUE

CPLR 511(b): The county specified as proper by defendant must in
fact be proper.
A plaintiff has the right, in the first instance, to choose the venue
of the action. CPLR 511(b) provides, however, that if the plaintiff's
choice is improper, the defendant may move to change the venue to
a county that "he specifies as proper." Will the county specified by
the defendant as proper be deemed so without regard to its propriety
in fact?
A domestic corporation stated in its certificate of incorporation
that Queens County was to be its principal place of business. Thereafter, it moved its facilities to Westchester County. Nevertheless, for
venue purposes as prescribed in CPLR 503(c), the corporation is
deemed to be a resident of Queens County and not Westchester
County.51 The defendant formally surrendered its authority to do business in New York prior to the commencement of this action, by filing
the requisite certificate. 52 As a foreign corporation, it had no residence
in New York for venue purposes. 53 The only proper place for this action, therefore, was the plaintiff's residence, Queens County." Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in Westchester
County. The defendant moved for a change of venue and, pursuant
to CPLR 511(b), specified New York County as a proper county. Its
contention was that it complied with the letter of the law in that it
was only required to name a county that it "specifies as proper," 5 the
50 "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). For a thorough discussion of the requirements
of procedural due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
53 See General Precision, Inc. v. Ametek, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 451, 257 N.YS.2d 120
(Sup, Ct. Westchester County), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
122, 143 (1965), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 757, 263 N.Y.S.2d 470 (2d Dep't 1965) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 121, 135 (1966); 7B McKINNEY'S

CPLR 503, supp. commentary at 12 (1965).
52 N.Y. Bus. CoiuP. LAW § 1310 (McKinney 1963).
53 Cf. 7B McKINEY's CPLR 503, commentary at 6 (1963).
54 CPLR 503(a).
55 CPLR 511(b).
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county need not be proper in fact. In Reliable Displays Corp. v. Maro
Industries, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rejected
this interpretation of the statute.57 It held that the county specified by
the defendant must also in fact be a proper one. The court added that
the only proper place of venue was Queens County, but inasmuch as
the defendant made no attempt to transfer the case there, the court
declined to so order 5 8
The decision of the court is clearly correct. If a plaintiff chooses
an improper venue, the defendant should not be permitted to change
the venue to an equally improper county. The defendant's remedy
should be limited to transferring the case to a proper county.
ARTICLE I I-

POOR PERSONS

CPLR 1102: City is not responsible for costs of publication in matrimonial action.
The costs involved in civil proceedings can operate as an effective
bar to an indigent seeking judicial relief. The Legislature has attempted to meet this problem through the passage of in forma pauperis
legislation. These statutes are usually limited in scope. In recent years,
however, the courts have expanded the effect of these statutes by construing them liberally and have provided additional protection for the
poor by similar construction of the Constitution. The courts have allowed an indigent to proceed with his action on the grounds of due
process and equal protection. The costs are usually borne by the public treasury.
While the indigent's fight of access to the courts has been definitively acknowledged, less than clear-cut guidelines have been promulgated for the resolution of some of the practical problems which have
been created in the process. A recent Appellate Division, First Department, decision underscores this problem. In Jackson v. Jackson,59 a
divorce action, the trial court had "direct[ed] the Treasurer of the
City of New York to pay the costs and expenses of service by publication
......

,,0 The appellate division reversed, declaring that

[n]o provision of the law has beeh called to our attention which
authorizes the City to make such payment in a matrimonial action
in behalf of an indigent plaintiff.'
Prior to this decision, it had become evident that "the burden of
56 67 Misc. 2d 747, 325 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971).
571d. at 748, 325 N.YS.2d at 618.
Sold. See 7B McKrNNEY's CPLR 509, commentary at 42 (1963).
59 37 App. Div. 2d 953, 326 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Ist Dep't 1971).
0d. at -, 326 N.Y..2d at 225.
61 Id. An argument to the contrary can be made. CPLR 1102(b) provides that:

